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Organizational downsizing:
Constraining,
cloning, learning
William McKinley, Carol M. Sanchez, and Allen G. Schick
Executive Overview

While downsizing rages through the U.S. economy, there is a great deal of
uncertainty about its bottom-line effects. This uncertainty raises questions about
why corporations have been so eager to engage in downsizing. In this article,

we propose an answer to these questions. Three social forces, which we call
constraining, cloning and learning, frequently provide a major impetus for

downsizing. We describe these forces, and point out conditions that lead to the
adoption of downsizing without due regard for its mixed consequences. We
suggest methods to improve executives' downsizing decision routines ...
methods that should enhance the chances of achieving intended benefits.

The Queen possessed a magic mirror, and when she stood before it, gazing at her own
reflection, she asked, "Mirror, mirror on the wall, Who is fairest of us all?" And it always
replied, "Thou, Queen, art the fairest of all."
But one day when the Queen asked her mirror the usual question, it replied, "Thou art
fair, my Queen, 'tis true. But Snow White is fairer far than you." Then the Queen flew
into the most awful passion and turned green in her jealousy.
"Snow White shall die!" she cried. "Yes, though it cost me my own life."

Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,
by Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm

We shall proclaim destruction-why? why?-well, because the idea is so fascinating!
But-we must get a little exercise. We'll have a few fires-we'll spread a few
legends.... And the whole earth will resound with the cry: "A new and righteous law is
coming."
The Devils, by Fedor Dostoevsky

Downsizing, defined here as "intended reductions of personnel," has swept
rapidly across the landscape of corporate America. Between 1987 and 1991, more

than eighty-five percent of the Fortune 1000 corporations downsized their

white-collar staffs.' During the first seven months of 1993, more than 350,000
American workers faced layoffs. This represents an increase of about a third
over the comparable layoff rate for recessionary 1991.2 Despite strong evidence
that the economy is robust, experts believe that downsizing is far from over.
Over the next two years, companies like GTE, Westinghouse, Gillette, and
Procter & Gamble will release thousands. In fact, the corporate job reduction

rate for January 1994 surpassed the equivalent rate for any other month since
1989.3
32
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Downsizing spreads, despite increasing evidence that it may not be effective in
achieving goals of cost reduction, increased productivity, and greater
profitability. Studies suggest that downsizing has a number of negative
consequences for the morale, commitment, and work effort of survivors. In the
face of this contrary evidence, why are American corporations downsizing in
record numbers? It is the purpose of this article to address this question.

While downsizing has
been viewed primarily
as a cost reduction
strategy, there is
considerable evidence
that downsizing does
not reduce expenses
as much as desired,
and that sometimes
expenses may
actually increase.

We first discuss some of the problems with downsizing, and review its uncertain
record in accomplishing bottom-line objectives. We then draw on an established
theory of organizations-institutional theory-to develop an explanation for
why downsizing has become so popular, despite ambiguity about its bottom-line
effectiveness. At the core of this argument is the idea that firms feel pressure to

downsize because being "lean and mean" has achieved the status of a valued
attribute-an end in itself. Like the queen obsessed by beauty in the story of

Snow White, corporations feel a powerful constraint to validate and display the
trait of leanness. Viewed from a Dostoevskian perspective, American

corporations are in danger of becoming fixated on job destruction, and on the
proclamation of downsizing as the "new and righteous law."
The Trouble With Downsizing

While downsizing has been viewed primarily as a cost reduction strategy,4
there is considerable evidence that downsizing does not reduce expenses as
much as desired, and that sometimes expenses may actually increase. More
than thirty years ago, James Lincoln warned that the costs of layoffs generally
outweigh the payroll savings to be gained from them.5 More recently, a survey
conducted by the Wyatt Company indicated that fewer than half of the
respondents who were using restructuring as a cost reduction method actually
met their cost reduction targets.6 Given that layoffs are the most common means
of downsizing, estimates of the dollar costs of layoffs provide some indication of
why cost reduction goals are elusive. By one calculation, the direct cost of
dismissing an employee earning an average salary of $30,000 per year is
approximately $7,000. Similarly, the cost of hiring replacements can range from
$5,000 per employee up to $50,000, if relocation expenses are involved.7 Since
companies have a tendency to replace some dismissed employees, it is clear
that downsizing can be costly.8 To illustrate, Nynex will take almost $3 billion
in charges against earnings to cover severance packages.9
There is also evidence that downsizing has limited effectiveness in enhancing
productivity. The same Wyatt Company survey mentioned earlier found that
only 22% of restructuring companies actually increased productivity to their

satisfaction. Another survey, conducted by the American Management

Association, put the equivalent figure at 34%. 10 Also, in Cameron, Freeman, and
Mishra's study of automobile industry downsizing, only a few of the firms
examined improved productivity relative to pre-downsizing levels.
Supplementing the Cameron, Freeman, and Mishra findings is a point made by
Perry: downsizing often eliminates employees with firm-specific skills, leading

to an interruption in productivity."1
One of the most important justifications for downsizing is an increase in
profitability, but here again, the jury is out. One comprehensive study examined
210 layoff announcements, and collected information on firm financial
performance in the years immediately preceding and following each layoff

announcement.12 On the average, net income relative to sales, return on assets
and return on equity increased in the first year following the layoff
33
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announcements, but not in the year after that. In no case did post-layoff

performance match the maximum levels achieved prior to the announcements.
These findings indicate that layoffs are followed by some improvements in
profitability, but the improvements are temporary, and don't represent a
recovery to pre-layoff levels. When combined with information available from
surveys of managers, these results suggest that layoffs are at best a temporary
stopgap for declining profitability.
Finally, studies demonstrate how downsizing has negative effects on the
morale, commitment, and work effort of those employees who survive

downsizing. When downsizing is accomplished through layoffs, the response of

survivors is closely linked to the treatment received by the layoff victims. One
study found that survivors tended to react most negatively to layoffs when they
identified with the layoff victims who they perceived as having been poorly

compensated. 13 This study suggests that executives managing layoffs lie
between a rock and a hard place. Without adequate severance pay,
outplacement services, and other forms of support to employees being laid off,
survivors will be alienated. On the other hand, support services to laid-off
employees increase costs. Either way, costs mount, and managers find
themselves engaging in repeated rounds of layoffs. Thus, executives become
trapped in cycles of headcount reduction and declining financial performance.
Constraining, Cloning, Learning

Given the uncertainty about downsizing's effectiveness as a cost-reduction and
profit-enhancing strategy, as well as the negative effects downsizing may have

on the attitudes of surviving employees, the question arises: why are so many
companies downsizing? With so many concerns about downsizing, why is it

spreading like wildfire through the ranks of America's largest corporations?
We believe that institutional theory provides a compelling answer to this

question. 14 Institutional theory emphasizes the role of "institutional rules" in
determining organizational form and process. Institutional rules are norms or
expectations shared by members of a society or a particular industry. They

specify how an organization should be structured and the kinds of managerial
behavior considered legitimate. An example of an institutional rule would be
the expectation that all large corporations should have a human resource
management department. An important point made by institutional theory is
that institutional rules often have little to do with technical or economic
efficiency. Instead, they function as "myths" to which organizations conform in
exchange for legitimacy, irrespective of whether conformity enhances efficiency.
Thus, institutional theory can help us understand why corporations downsize,
even though downsizing may be costly and may not lead to increased
productivity or improved financial performance.
Institutional theorists have identified three specific social forces that explain
why organizations adopt institutional rules. We use the terms "constraining,"
"cloning," and "learning" to describe these social forces. s Constraining forces
pressure organizations to conform to institutional rules that define legitimate
structures and management activities-the right walk to walk, the right talk to
talk, the right look to look. Cloning forces pressure organizations to mimic the
actions of the most prestigious, visible members of their industry. Finally,
learning forces emerge through the management practices taught in universities
or professional associations throughout the corporate world. Each of these three
forces plays a role in the spread of corporate downsizing, as we point out below.
34
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Constraining. Social constraints concerning downsizing have shifted in recent
years, at least in the United States. Downsizing, or workforce reduction, had
been connected with the concept of decline.'6 As such, downsizing was viewed
negatively. In recent scholarly and practitioner-oriented writing, however,
downsizing has been disconnected from the decline concept. As a result,
downsizing is now interpreted positively, and seems to be attaining the status

of an expectation. This status is strengthened by a parallel shift in the value
placed on large size. Once regarded as an indicator of organizational

effectiveness, large size is now shunned. As a recent Fortune article noted, "The
chiefs of America's biggest companies seem caught in the grip of what might be
called wee-ness envy-my company's workforce is smaller than yours."'7

As a recent Fortune
article noted, "The
chiefs of America's
biggest companies
seem caught in the
grip of what might be
called wee-ness
envy-my company's
workforce is smaller
than yours."

Reflecting these basic ideological shifts, descriptions of excellently managed
corporations emphasize the importance of "simple form, lean staff," and
planned downsizers are described as "heroes."'8 Managers are exhorted to

shrink their organizations to become more competitive and to achieve
revitalization. Linking terms like "hero," "competitive," and "revitalization" with

downsizing helps establish downsizing as desirable. These descriptions
function in the same way as the legends in the quote from Dostoevsky
above-they rationalize downsizing as the new "law." The law-like status of
downsizing is further reinforced by the many articles and books offering

guidelines for effective downsizing. The social constraint that downsizing's
taken-for-granted status exerts on CEOs was succinctly captured by Russell
Baker in a recent New York Times column: "The boss of any large corporation
that hasn't fired at least enough people to make up an army division has a lot
of explaining to do to his buddies down at the CEO Club."'9
As corporations conform to social constraints promoting "leanness," downsizing
spreads more widely, and becomes attractive as a means of demonstrating
legitimacy. The pressure to downsize is nowhere more evident than in the
relationship between large U.S. corporations and the stock market. As noted in
recent press reports, the investment community appears to have embraced
downsizing with enthusiasm. These reports carry headlines like "Wall Street
Hails Beat of Walking Feet" and "How Layoffs Pay Off."20 The anecdotal
evidence provided by such reports is consistent with findings from large-sample
research on layoff announcements and stock price changes. One study of 194
layoff announcements by large corporations found that such announcements
associated with restructuring or consolidation were followed by increased stock

prices.21 These results suggest that investors and securities analysts respond
favorably to downsizing and restructuring, and this can exert a powerful force
on top managers to downsize. This force is likely to be especially strong if an
executive's compensation package and bonuses are keyed to the performance of
the corporation's stock. Even if a CEO doesn't have this kind of incentive
package, she has to be vigilant about keeping stock prices high, as a defense
against corporate raiders. The pressures to downsize, and announce it publicly,
can become overwhelming.
Cloning. Downsizing spreads through imitation, or "cloning." Cloning is a
reaction to uncertainty. In the face of the extreme uncertainty generated by

global competition, rapid technological innovation, and a turbulent legal and
political environment, organizations have a strong tendency to mimic the
behavior of other organizations. This cloning behavior applies to downsizing as
well as to other management techniques: total quality management, process
reengineering, worker empowerment, self-managing teams, and so on. Like
35
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these techniques, downsizing seems to have acquired the status of a fad,
replicating swiftly through numerous corporate sectors. As is true for
constraining, the incidence of cloning is not dependent on hard evidence that
the practice being adopted enhances financial performance. Instead, cloning
derives its appeal from similarity: corporations imitating the downsizing

activities of other corporations demonstrate that they are in step with the crowd,
that they are "with it," and that they are actively doing something to address
problems.
An excellent example of how cloning operates to spread downsizing is the wave
of restructuring currently sweeping through the oil industry. The Wall Street
Journal recently reported that Texaco is restructuring and downsizing in
response to similar moves by Mobil and British Petroleum. In all, ten oil

companies-Texaco, Mobil, British Petroleum, Atlantic Richfield, Unocal, Royal
Dutch/Shell Group, Elf Aquitaine, Exxon, Chevron, and Amoco-are in various

stages of shrinkage. These corporations have made cost-cutting their "mantra,"
cloning each other and firms like General Electric and Xerox.22

The spread of cost
accounting techniques
through business
education and the
professionalization of
accounting therefore
plays a role in
rationalizing
downsizing as a
legitimate activity.

It might seem far-fetched to argue that a "hard" strategic decision like

downsizing could be motivated by cloning. However, research on other strategic
decisions is consistent with this interpretation. For example, the decision to
acquire other companies is often justified in terms of bottom-line criteria like
efficiency, increased market penetration, or shareholder wealth. But a recent
empirical study found evidence that imitation played an important role in the

acquisition activities of U.S. corporations. Corporations tended to mimic the
acquisition behaviors of other firms to which they were linked by directorship
ties. Similarly, a second study indicated that imitation was a factor in
diversification by savings and loans into new markets. Thrifts tended to imitate
the diversification patterns of large, successful competitors, so that the new
market selections of these prestigious role models became self-replicating.23
Learning. A third social force that helps spread standard management practices
through the corporate world is learning. Learning takes place through a

complex network of educational institutions and professional associations.
Regarding the specific phenomenon of downsizing, an example of how learning
promotes downsizing is found in the curricula of U.S. business schools. These
schools teach successive cohorts of students standard methods of cost
accounting. Such methods, when combined with decisions to outsource in a
manufacturing environment, can encourage progressive downsizing of
production. Given normal techniques of allocating overhead costs, initial
outsourcing makes remaining components of a manufacturing operation appear

more costly. This apparent "costliness" increases the motivation to outsource,
and may set in motion a spiral of incremental outsourcing and downsizing of
productive capacity. The spread of cost accounting techniques through business
education and the professionalization of accounting therefore plays a role in
rationalizing downsizing as a legitimate activity.

In addition, learning contributes to downsizing through the development of

careers like that of Jack "The Ripper" Grundhofer.24 Mr. Grundhofer, currently
the Chairman of First Bank System, is an executive prized for his willingness to
lay off employees. Grundhofer learned his firing skills at Wells Fargo, "where
slashing jobs had been a religion." To the extent that downsizing is rewarded in
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the early careers of U.S. managers like Mr. Grundhofer, and is seen as a route
to upward mobility, corporate career paths became a context in which
managers learn to downsize.

The three social forces described in this section-constraining, cloning, and
learning-are related, but distinct, causes of downsizing. The distinction

between them is highlighted by referring back to our oil industry example.
Constraining forces operate in the oil industry through the promotion of a norm
that downsizing is good, partly as a result of statements made by securities
analysts. Cloning forces prompt petroleum companies to imitate one another's
restructuring initiatives. Finally, an additional pressure for downsizing is being

created by the positive reinforcement that often follows it-a powerful impetus

for learning. Specifically, corporations such as Texaco and Mobil have
experienced stock price increases following their restructuring announcements.
The combination of constraining, cloning, and learning helps account for the
wave-like progress of petroleum industry downsizing.

Constraining, Cloning, Learning-Where Are They Strongest?
While constraining, cloning, and learning are important drivers of downsizing,
they do not operate with equal force in all situations. In this section, we identify
four conditions that enhance the power of these social pressures for downsizing:
1) dependence; 2) ambiguous performance standards; 3) uncertain core
technologies; and 4) frequent corporate interaction patterns.
Dependence. Firms dependent on other parties for critical resources experience

constraints to conform to the norms advocated by the dominant partners.
Conformity reduces the probability that a dependent firm will be viewed as
undesirable, and it "greases the wheels" of the interaction between the parties.
For example, if a publicly traded corporation has a large percentage of its stock
held by institutional investors, the corporation is dependent on those investors
and the securities analysts who advise them. Keeping the goodwill of the
investors and the analysts is essential to maintaining the stock price, and
guarding against corporate raiders. If the institutional investors and the
analysts place a positive value on downsizing, the dependent corporation will
experience strong constraints to downsize. Downsizing allows the dependent
company to create a favorable impression, and tap into the positive "legends"
that are associated with downsizing. Such short-term advantages are
compelling, no matter what the long-term financial consequences of downsizing
may be. In fact, the long-term financial results of downsizing are probably
unknowable, while the myths connected with it-getting lean, strong, fast, and
fit-are bright, powerful, and immediate. They are constantly repeated in the
business press, and seem to be taken for granted in many investment circles.
Thus, dependent firms are willing, even eager, to downsize.
Ambiguous performance standards. In some types of organizational units,
performance standards, including standards of financial performance, are
relatively clear. A good example of such a unit would be a manufacturing plant,
where performance is assessed in terms of physical output goals, or the
percentage of capacity utilized. In such units, performance is relatively easy to
measure quantitatively, and can be used as a yardstick to guide decisions
about when to downsize. Manufacturing plants, for example, typically downsize
their workforce and sell off capital assets when the percentage of capacity
utilized dips below a certain level. Here the zone of managerial discretion open
to the social pressures of constraining, cloning, and learning is narrow, and we
37

This content downloaded from 148.61.108.107 on Thu, 13 Dec 2018 21:03:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Academy of Management Executive

expect downsizing to be determined primarily by changes in performance over
time.

However, many organizational units lack clear performance standards. Units

like corporate headquarters, R&D labs, and new product development teams
often exhibit little consensus around goals. Given this lack of consensus,

performance measurements are ambiguous. The uncertainty about performance

assessment increases the pressure on managers to keep up appearances by
demonstrating conformity with institutional rules. If those rules include norms
for downsizing, constraining and cloning will be bolstered as determinants of
the downsizing process.

Uncertain core technologies. Just as there are differences in the clarity of
performance standards, so too are there differences in the uncertainty of core
technologies.25 Some firms, like brewers, automobile manufacturers, and
chemical processors, have relatively certain technologies. Few exceptions occur
in the manufacturing process, and when exceptions do occur, there are standard
procedures for dealing with them. On the other hand, some businesses have to
rely on technologies that are much more uncertain. Examples that illustrate this
category would be consulting firms, advertising agencies, some types of
retailing, and the film and popular music industries. Here technologies are
non-routine and unpredictable, because many exceptions take place in the
production or customer service process, and when exceptions occur, the reason
for them often isn't clear.

When a firm's core technology is uncertain, the relationship between means and
ends is ambiguous. Managers don't know exactly what inputs, or how many of
them, are required to generate a particular amount and quality of output. For
instance, uncertain technologies limit management's ability to accurately
estimate required staffing levels. Therefore, decisions about whether to
downsize are likely to be governed by what other companies are doing.
Corporations will be more likely to use downsizing as a means of demonstrating
legitimacy when they don't have a clear idea of what their optimal size level is.
Finally, technological uncertainty helps explain why white-collar workers and
middle managers have taken the big hits in recent episodes of corporate
downsizing. These employees usually work with more uncertain technologies
than blue-collar workers, and therefore they have been vulnerable to the
bandwagon dynamics of downsizing in the 1990s.
Frequency of interaction. A fourth condition that magnifies the influence of

constraining, cloning, and learning forces on downsizing is frequent interaction
between firms. Frequent interaction between competitors, or between customers
and their suppliers, facilitates imitation of downsizing initiatives. Also, frequent
interaction encourages the creation of institutional rules that govern acceptable
behavior and exert pressure toward conformity. The greater the interaction
among firms, the greater the need for such rules to maintain order. In such an
environment, a localized norm that "downsizing is good" can quickly become a
powerful inducement for downsizing.
Last but not least, frequent interaction is a fertile breeding ground for the

spread of corporate downsizing through learning. Corporations that hire one
another's executives, rub elbows at conferences, and use the same consultants,
tend to learn one another's problems and solutions. This interaction promotes
learning about how to downsize, and facilitates dissemination of the bright,
attractive myths that make downsizing so compelling.
38
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Empirical studies support the idea that frequent interaction facilitates the
spread of organizational practices through cloning and learning. One study
showed that network ties among corporate contributions officers led them to

mimic one another's patterns of contributions to non-profits.26 The study of
acquisitions referred to earlier indicated that directorship ties were an
important channel for imitation of other corporations' acquisition activities. The

strategy of acquisition became a model that was learned and imitated by
executives through sitting on the boards of other firms that were practicing the
strategy. If these interactions promote the cloning and learning of activities like

charitable giving and acquisitions, it is reasonable to assume that such

interaction also encourages the cloning and learning of downsizing.
Exhibit 1 summarizes the discussion in this section by showing the three social
forces for downsizing and the conditions that promote each of them.

Social Forces

Promoted by: Constraining Cloning Learming
Dependence
Yes
Ambiguous Performance Standards Yes Yes
Uncertain Core Technologies Yes Yes
Frequent Interaction Between Firms Yes Yes Yes
Exhibit 1. Social Forces for Downsizing and the Conditions That Promote Them

Implications for Managers

The preceding analysis has a number of implications for managers interested in
evaluating the appropriateness of a downsizing strategy, and reducing the level

of external force for downsizing. These implications can be summarized as
follows: 1) reduce dependence; 2) clarify performance standards; 3) moderate
technological uncertainty; and 4) disrupt standard interaction patterns.

The strategy of
acquisition became a
model that was
learned and imitated
by executives through
sitting on the boards
of other firms that
were practicing the
strategy.

Reduce dependence. We argued that dependence on other organizations

enhances social constraints to downsize, if the dominant partner(s) have bought
into the assumption that downsizing is good. To reduce such social pressures,
executives might consider ways of lowering dependence on external
stakeholders. One means of accomplishing this is the use of employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs) or outright employee buyouts of a company's stock. A
recent example is the successful employee buyout of 55% of the stock of UAL

Corp., the parent company of United Airlines.27 Employees exchanged wage
cuts, work rule concessions, and a cash payment for majority ownership of their
company. The result has been a reduction of labor costs, and an apparent
softening of the social constraints to downsize associated with stock ownership
by outside investors. The loosening of such constraints has left the company
freer to assess staffing levels on technical grounds, and United has recently
announced its intention to hire more employees.
Clarify performance standards. Earlier we suggested that unclear performance
standards increase the tendency of managers to imitate the downsizing
activities of other corporations. Like the queen gazing into her mirror every day,
managers seem to be infatuated with downsizing as an end in itself, rather than
a means to other goals. To make the reasons for downsizing more apparent,
managers must clarify performance standards, and question downsizing's effect
on those standards.
39
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Clear standards replace rationalized myths with specific performance targets.
Goals like "becoming more competitive," "improving efficiency," "making better
use of technology," and "becoming more flexible" are illusory targets, because
they are difficult to measure quantitatively and never fully attainable.
Managers should be skeptical of downsizing initiatives that are rationalized
solely in such terms, if improvement in financial performance is the primary
objective of downsizing. We recommend that executives formulate specific cost
reduction targets for every downsizing program, paying close attention to the
costs involved in achieving a given headcount reduction. Payroll costs to be
saved should be compared with the costs of achieving those savings (e.g., early
retirement incentives, outplacement support expenditures, continuing medical

benefits, financial counseling for layoff victims, fees for downsizing consultants,
etc.). A payback period should be computed, and assessed according to the
same criteria that govern evaluation of investments directed toward growth.
Moderate technological uncertainty. Reducing the uncertainty of core
technologies should help companies increase their understanding of the
relationship between inputs and outputs.

Reengineering could be a powerful tool for moderating the uncertainty of core

technologies, as long as "reengineering" is not just used as a label for programs
that have downsizing as their primary goal. Our suggestion is that
reengineering programs concentrate first on understanding the nature of the

existing processes. This knowledge can then serve as a basis for redesigning
processes to enhance specific output goals. Consistent with our emphasis on
clear performance standards, the output goals should be stated in quantitative,
measurable terms. As a return of reengineering, executives could hopefully
obtain more accurate estimates of the number of employees required to "run" a
particular process effectively. If those estimates implied that downsizing was
warranted, a headcount reduction could be implemented with the knowledge
that it was driven by technical criteria, rather than ideological constraints or
cloning responses to uncertainty. If managers take an incremental,
experimental approach to reengineering, they can increase their chances of
achieving successful company-wide restructuring. Managers could begin by
selecting a few organizational units that are similar in terms of important
demographic and structural characteristics: customers served, geographical
location, nature of core technology, and so on. Reengineering and any
downsizing connected with it could be undertaken in one or two of the units,
holding other units as controls. If the experiments work, then reengineering
could be rolled out cautiously on a company-wide basis.

If managers take an
incremental,
experimental
approach to
reengineering, they
can increase their
chances of achieving
successful
company-wide
restructuring.

Disrupt standard interaction patterns. Finally, our framework has suggested that
frequent interaction among industry executives can accelerate the spread of
downsizing (see Exhibit 1). To counterbalance these dynamics, we recommend
that executives "disrupt" their normal interaction patterns from time to time.
This is particularly important if an executive's social interactions revolve
around close friendships or business associations with other executives whose
firms are committed to downsizing. Executives may need to extend their

networks. Anonymous visits to plants, retail outlets, and other working locations
can generate different perspectives. Above all, the "disruption" process
introduces variety and diversity into the flow of information that executives
depend on, reducing the chances that downsizing decisions will simply be the
product of conformity to what's fashionable in today's executive suites.
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Conclusion

In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that we are not opposed to
downsizing per se, or to corporations that are implementing downsizing
programs. Instead, our purpose has been to alert managers to the possibility
that downsizing may be partly driven by social forces, and not motivated
entirely by predictable financial benefits. Managers engaged in downsizing
may be sacrificing the long-term health of the corporation for short-term gains
in shareholder perceptions and short-term illusions of control or certainty.
Downsizing decisions prompted by ideology and mimicry are at best foolish,
and at worst dangerous and unethical. Perhaps a nobler challenge to
management is to make better use of their existing workforce to generate higher
revenues and increased profits. In other words, executives need to recall the
benefits of growth. As Wayne Calloway, CEO of PepsiCo, put it recently, "You
can't save your way to prosperity. That alone won't get you there."28
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Executive Commentary
A. Catherine Higgs, Allstate Insurance Company
As McKinley, Sanchez and Schick point out, companies are strongly influenced

by the way other firms handle similar situations. In recent times, many
phenomena have converged to make similarity of corporate action more rather
than less probable. Ease and prevalence of communications such as print,
television, radio, e-mail or the Internet have led to rapid deployment of
information about trends. Business people attend the same conferences and

seminars, participate in the same univeristy-based executive education
programs, and network with each other in the same professional organizations.

Strategies which focus on quality and reengineering encourage companies to
benchmark or do best practices studies. In the process, they come to know who's
doing what and what they think works best. Most major corporations are, in the
current buzz words, seeking to "cut cycle time," "reduce costs," and "satisfy the
customer"-often in the same ways.
Despite these conforming forces, downsizing seems to me to go beyond a mere

fad. It's become part of a continuing longer-term aspect of social and economic
evolution. The current phase of this evolution has been referred to as the
transition from the industrial to the information age. Not all downsizing is as

simple as it may look to either the external observer or even to the internal
executive who uses it. More than shrinking the workforce of an organization,
much of the change we've seen represents a permanent shift in the social and
economic structure. What follows are my reasons for drawing this conclusion.
Trends such as increasing automation of work started well over a decade ago

with large robotic units installed in manufacturing and assembly plants. In the
service sector, larger scale computing power meant that efficiency was
achieved with larger processing centers. Rather than interfere, the shift in
computing power from large mainframes to current client server networks has
continued the trend. Work is more automated and tasks of former clerk forces
are done by intelligent computing. Each new way of automating and
streamlining tasks has meant that more work can be handled by fewer workers.

What's more, the former clerk forces and their supervisors are not easily,
quickly or affordably retrained as knowledge workers. When downsizing
evolves as part of this industrial-to-information evolution, the primary driver is
not simply imitation of other companies or response to the currently fashionable
expectations of investment analysts.
Another driver of this shift is the aging of the large contingent of baby boomers
in the workforce. Simply put, some companies who have downsized have found
no other way of dealing with the quandary posed by the oversupply of

candidates for the increasingly fewer managerial positions at the top in
flattened organization structures. During the last ten years, middle and
upper-level jobs in many firms have been populated with highly paid people
ready for the next level but with nowhere to go. Companies are asking
themselves whether this tenure capacity costs more than they can afford,

particularly if these individuals' skills are more appropriate for the management
style of a bygone era.
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The authors' point that companies may downsize because other companies are,
without anyone knowing if such an initiative really works, is an argument that
could also be made about many other new business strategies or initiatives.
The same criteria should be used to determine the viability of a downsizing
approach as are used in any other business decision-the business case.
Companies need to ask what they intend to accomplish, how implementation
will be tracked, and what measures will determine ultimate success. As
espoused by Mike Vitale of Ernst & Young, or David Norton of Renaissance
Strategy, this "balanced scorecard" approach simply states that when you lay
out your strategy, you also specify the key indicators of successful
implementation from multiple perspectives, including what business payoff you
anticipate. The multiple perspectives are more than financial; they include
performance as viewed by customers, improvement of business processes,
inventions for the future, and the impact on the workforce. Whether downsizing
or other business fad, this framework of making a business case will at least
enhance the possibility of success rather than leave you to pursue an untried
and unproved course of action with indeterminable results.
Dr. A. Catherine Higgs is director of human resource research at the Allstate Research and Planning
Center, Allstate Insurance Company. One of her most recent assignments was as a member of the
reinvention (or reengineering) team for Allstate's home office organization. Dr. Higgs is a member of
the AME Executive Advisory Panel

For permission to reproduce this article, contact: Academy of Management, P.O. Box 3020, Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510-8020

44

This content downloaded from 148.61.108.107 on Thu, 13 Dec 2018 21:03:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

